Ülo Ennuste majandusartiklid

Narratiivreferaat kübrehägustajate sanktsioneerimisest

Visand 10.V 15  (telegrammi stiilis)

Narratiivreferaat: hübriidsõjas rahvuslikult õigustatud küberdiversiooni vastasest sanktsioneerimisest – Eesti näidetel

  1. Kissinger (2014, vt vastavat Remarki) väidab esimene küberrünnak (IT instrumentidega) praeguses hübriidsõjas tehti Kremli poolt just Eesti vastu 2007 seoses nn pronksimäsuga: tõepoolest kuid see oli Wiener (1948) mõistes eeskätt kitsalt kommunikatiivtehniline diversioon. Kremli ulatuslik poliitküberneetiline juhtimisteoreetiline/strateegiline (kontspetsiooniline otsustusideoloogiline – vt Wiener 1948) rünnak Lääne ja eriti Balti-Riikide teadmusruumide hägustamiseks – nende rahvuslike teadmusruumide mürgitamisega ning seega nende usaldusväärsuse/reputatsi0oni õõnestamisega – algas Eesti vastu ilmselt juba aastaid varem nn NL taastamise agenda propageerimisega ning selle pseudoteadusliku doktriini justkui ajaloolise õigustamisega – ning seda suuresti internatsionaalsete informatsiooni manipuleerivate putinoididest kimäärtrollide bandede poolt. Eeskätt Lääne-Riikide reputatsiooni õõnestavate valede fabritseerimisega ja globaalse kommunikeerimisega ning seega eeskätt nende riikide rahvuslike teadmusruumide mürgitamisega ning seega rahvuslikult ratsionaalse otsustustegevuse halvamiseks (üks viimatisi paremaid analüüse selle kohta vt Remarki: Lordide Koja (LK)Raport (2015)). Muide Eesti vastu küberneetika strateegiliselt alustati Kremli poolt annektsioonilist ideoloogilist rünnakut juba 1993 nn Narva referendumiga (vt Laar 2015 lk235) mis ei kujunenud militaarseks (Krimm 2014 mudeli järgi) ilmselt Venemaa Valitsuse tolleaegse 1991 õlitransiidi poliitika huvide tõttu läbi Narva (Hamilton 2005 lk301)
  2. Lääne Sanktsioonid Kremli hübriidsõja vastu (vt nt LK Raport (2015) ja Ennuste (2014)) on üldiselt fragmentaarsed ning eeskätt seostatud Kremli militaardiversiooniga Ukrainas (koostöös viiendate kimäärkolonnidega). Ilmutatud kujul need sanktsioonid on ainelised/tehnoloogilised ja ei hõlma oluliselt mingeid küberneetilisi juhtimisteoreetilisi/informatsioonilis sanktsioneerimise instrumente (sh nt vasturünnakuid) – nii Lääne rahvuslike teadmusruumide hägustamise vastu ega sanktsioonide raames ilmselt ka mitte küberneetiliste vasturünnakute strateegiad rahvuslike teadmusruumide kvaliteedi/usaldusväärsuse kaitseks – vt LK Raport:- tõsi et Eestisse on rajatud NATO üks eeskätt tehnoloogilise kuid vist mitte kontseptuaalse sektori küberkaitse keskus
  3. Vastavad rahvusvahelised sõltumatud/usaldusväärsed rangelt teadusloogilised eelretsenseeritud Teadusuuringud (vt Remarki) eeskätt rahvuslike teadmusruumide usaldusväärsuse kindlustamise ning kvaliteedi tõstmise matemaatiliste mänguteoreetiliste mudelite alusel ning rahvusvaheliste kiskjalike (2014 Nobelisti J. Tirole termin oligopolide teoorias) agentidega küberdiversioonide ja suurte määramatuste tingimustes ning võimalike sanktsioneerimise kontra-strateegiate arvestamisel – seejuures hierahiliste eisndusdemokraat mehhanismide abil (Ennuste&Matin 1989) – osutuvad tohutult komplitseerituteks ning seega paratamatult fragmenteerituteks: nende adekvaatne rakenduslik käsitlemine idiosünkraatilistes tingimustes (nagu Eesti kus tegemist on nn VF lähisvälismaaga mis omab väga suurt venekeelset diaspoorad VF agressiivse TV ideloogilise mõju all jne) osutub ligikaudselt võimalikuks eeskätt rangete fragmentmudelite heuristilise metasünteesi alusel (Ennuste 2008)
  4. Uurimismudelite analüüsist vähemalt heuristiliselt järeldub vähemalt Eesti küsitluste näidetel et diversiooniliste küberagentide sanktsioneerimine nõuab komplekselt a) nii ainelist (finantsilist ja tehnoloogilist) kui ka moraalset (reputatsioonilist kui ka kriminaliseerivat) sanktsioneerimist ja seda nii strateegiliste diversioonide kui ka ekslikult eksitavate kaasuste puhul b) sanktsioneerimist nii administratiivselt (eeskätt materiaalselt kui juriidiliselt) ning ka demokraatlikud kodanikeühenduslikult (eeskätt moraalselt) c) nii internatsionaalselt (välismaised trollide puhul eeskätt kontra- atakkidega) kui ka kodumaiselt (eeskätt finantsiliselt) ja seda nii kontra trollide kui kontra ekslikult eksitavate agentide vastu – viimaste hulka võivad kuuluda isegi ebapädevad sanktsioneerivad institutsioonid nii administratiivsed kui ka vabaühenduslikud
  5. Diskussion a) Väikeriigi Eesti reputatsiooni õõnestavad Kremli küberrünnakud rahvusvahelistes organisatsioonides ning kolmandates riikides – eriti nende riikide sotsiaalmeedias – vajavad eeskätt Eesti poolset tõrjet nendes organisatsioonides. Nt Kerry (2015) äsja väitis seoses Putin’i sõjaga Lääne vastu Ukraina pinnal et „Moskvast (Kreml, putinoidid jne, üe) valetavad meile näkku“ – ja nad teevad seda eriti väikeriikide puhul edasi – niikaua kui Maailma Poliitkorraldus (vt Kissinger 2014) ei jõusta ameeriklastega eesotsas piisavaid väikeriike kaasavaid rahvusvahelisi küberkaitsemehhanisme – mis nii  küber- ning tuumarelvade-ajastul apokalüptiliste riskide (s.h agentide moraaliriskide ning usaldusväärsuse arvestamisega) olemas olul on maailmakorralduse vältimatu imperatiiv (nt Kissinger 2014)   b) VF lähisvälismaasse kuuluval Eestil on omapoolsete lokaalsete sanktsioonide disainimisel ja trahvide profileerimisl (nt Anderson et al. 2015) tingimata imperatiiv arvestada nii vastavate EL kui ka NATO positsioonide raamidega kui kõrgemate multihierarhiliste kordineerimistõketega – seejuures tuleb Venemaa kontrolli all olevate siinsete tütarfirmade sanktsioneerimise puhul arvestada et 0-kasumimaksusüsteem võib esile kutsuda täiendavaid teoreetilisi/juriidilisi komplikatsioone (vt nt Fuest&Hemmelgarn 2005 väitel võib just väliskapitali domineerimine tingida kasumimaksu nullistamise ja just Vernon&Wolff 2015 järgi Eestis ongi nt väliskapitali osakaal panganduses üle 90% – seega investeeringute anomaalne väljamahitamine Eestist petunimetuste all võib suuresti olla väliskapitali manipuleering mis vajab sanktsioneerimist (kuigi valitsuse poolt subsideeritud 0-kasumimaksu kaudu) c) jääb veelkord lisada et teoreetiliselt on ka lokaalsete kübesanktsioonide strkutureerimine äärmiselt komplitseeritud ning vastava strateegia range tuletamine kompaktsest tervikmudelist isegi dekompositsioonimeetodil väga kohmakas ning aeganõudev – ning arvestades rahvusliku teadmusstruktuuri paratamatut hägustust hübriidsõja tingimustes – vaevalt et mõttekas: ilmselt esmane väljapääs on lihtsustatud osamudelite lahendite heuristiline metasüntees d) nagu juba rõhutatud tuleb nimetatud hägustatuse talitsemiseks rakendada täiendavat informatsioonilist sanktsioneerimist. Nt Eesti põhiseaduses sisaldab pr 106 teaduspõhist nõuet et maksusüsteemid ei kuulu referendumite alla (kuuluvad ekspertide pädevusse) ja seega peavad välja jääma ka valimisloosungitest – sellest nõudest hiilitakse aga politikaanide poolt räigelt ja teadustühiselt mööda koos kaasneva teadmusruumi populistliku risustamisega – sest mingeid sanktsioone taolisele rahvusliku jätkusuutilkkuse riski süvendamisele  praktiliselt ei järgne (nt 0-kasumimaksuga populistlikult arvatakse saavutada suuremat välisinvesteeringute sisevoolu – kuid tegelikkuses on Eestis praeguseks olukord osutunud vastupidiseks ning mõningal juhul sanktsioneerimise asemel võib toimuda hargmaiste tütarfirmade subsideerimine  (Ennuste 2012)  e) Eesti rahvusliku teadmusstruktuuri hägustamise oluliseks ohuks on suure etniline hetorogeensuse olemasolu peamiselt stalinistliku 1940-53 genotsiidi tagajärjel (vt “Valge raamat …” 2005). Seejuures venekeelse immigrantelanikkonna hirmud igasuguse liberaliseerimise ning läänestumise vastu on oluliselt suuremad põhirahvusest (vt nt Ott&Ennuste 1996) – mis nt muutis ka nn Narva 1993 referendumi kriisi rahvuslikult äärmiselt ohtlikuks nagu ka pronksimäsu 2007 ning praegu kogu Putin’i agressiivse lähisvälismaa poliitika eriti Balti-Riikide suhtes.                                                                                                     Järeldused: Wiener (1948) järgi küberneetikal on kaks tiiba: kontroll ja kommunikatsioon. Praeguse hübriidsõja tingimustes ja küberrünnakute sanktsioneerimise kontekstis on perifeersel liikmesriigil ilmselt otstarbekas järgida oma liitude vastavaid strateegiaid ning koordineerida oma küberneetilised mehhanismid vastavalt liitude tuumriikide süsteemidele kui kõige teaduspõhisematele (vt nt Lordide Koja Rapordit 2015). Kissinger (2015) järgi selles Kremli Hübriidsõjas Lääne vastu – toimus esimene küberrünne 2007 aprillis Eesti vastu pronksmäsu käigus. See oli otsene kommuniatsioonidiversioon ning sai efektiivselt ning õiglaselt sanktsioneeritud: Eesti blokeeris mõningatele kremli võimurite ELi sissesõidu. Laar (2015) tõdeb et kaudne küberneetiline agressioon eeskätt rahvuslike teadmusruumide hägustamisega (ideoloogilise diversiooniga – stalinistlikus keelepruugis) – algas Kremli poolt EV(1991) vastu intensiivselt juba aastal 1993 seoses Narvas tollajal stalinistide poolt korraldatava nn separatisliku autonoomia referendumiga ning Putin’i mahitusel: selleks et õõnestada EV reputatsiooni ja seada rahvusvaheliselt kahtluse alla EV territoriaalne terviklikkus. Kahjuks sellel perioodil EV käed osutusid liialt lühikeseks et mingit sanktsioonilist kontraattakki üritada. Tegelikult ongi selgunud et Kremli putinoidide trollide (ka THI poolt nt 24.II 2015 kasutet väljend) kolonnide poolt rahvuslike teadmusstruktuuride moonutamise ning absurdidega risustamise kuritegelikkust on raske efektiivselt ning teaduspõhiselt sanktsioneerida isegi väimekatel EL/NATO ühendustel: nt putinoidide hämasid seoses reisilennuki MH17 kaasusega  – rääkimata EV vähesest võimekusest resoluutselt väärata et nt nagu oleks EW vabatahtlikult liitunud NLiga või nagu et stalinistlikes genotsiidides eesti rahva kallal (vt „Valge raamat … “ 2005) ei olnud peasüüdlasek mitte Päts – ja – taolisi inimsusvataseid teavitusi rangelt sanktsioneerida ongi internetiajastul keerukas kriminaliseerida – seda eriti demokraatliku sõnavabaduse politikaanselt liigliberaalsel teadusvaegsel ning hägusloogilisel käsitlemisel (vt nt Fucuyama 2014). Seda eriti rahvuslike sotsiaalküberneetiliste mehhanismide (nt ESM, liikmesriikide kooskõlastatud maksusüsteemid, rahvuslike teadmusruumide kvaliteedi kujundamise mehhanismide teaduspõhine disainimine) disainimisel vaegküberneetiliselt ja politikaanselt/plutokraatlikult – eeskätt puhtalt populistlike valimiskampaaniate käigus ja nukataguste hägusloogiliste (mitte teadusloogiste nt Popper’i mõistes) erapoolikute arvamuskodade ärgitusel – mitte küllalt teaduspõhiselt Wiener’i järgi (muide arvestades tema eeskujul sotsiaalmehhanismides ka  võimalike kaabaklike/korruptantlike moraali-riskiliste agentide olemasoluga – ja vastavate efektiivse sanktsioneerimise mehhanismide jõustamisega + internetiajastule omaselt ka küberdiversantlike elementidega).

Remargid

 Anderson, Lisa R., Gregory DeAngelo, Winand Emons, Beth Freeborn, Hannes Lang.2015:

DP10576 Penalty Structures and Deterrence in a Two-Stage Model: Experimental Evidence

Abstract: Increasing penalty structures for repeat offenses are ubiquitous in penal codes, despite little empirical or theoretical support. Multi-period models of criminal enforcement based on the standard economic approach of Becker (1968) generally find that the optimal penalty structure is either flat or declining. We experimentally test a two-stage theoretical model that predicts decreasing penalty structures will yield greater deterrence than increasing penalty structures. We find that decreasing fine structures are more effective at reducing risky behavior. Additionally, our econometric analyses reveal a number of behavioral findings. Subjects are deterred by past convictions, even though the probability of detection is independent across decisions. Further, subjects appear to take the two-stage nature of the decision making task into account, suggesting that subjects consider both current and future penalties. Even controlling for the fine a subject faces for any given decision, being in a decreasing fine structure has a significant effect on deterrence.

Ennuste, Ülo. 2014. „Towards Special Methodological Problems of Macro-Optimal Sociocybernetic International Economic Sanctioning Coordination Modelling: Introductory Remarks oPreliminary Postulates and Conjectures“ – Baltic Journal of European Studies Tallinn University of Technology (ISSN 2228-0588), Vol. 4, No. 2 (17), 150-158:

http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/bjes.2014.4.issue-2/bjes-2014-0021/bjes-2014-0021.xml?format=INT

    Üks lõik näiteks:

„ … Modelling remarks
Theoretically, the most complicated problem in the planning of collective
sanctions in the EU context in this third round is the central optimal coordination
of the defensive/deterrent economic sanction measures taken by the imposing
EU Member States, as these penalty measures, projected by the imposing
countries against transgressing third national economy, are as a rule hurting the
Member States’ economies as well—and—directly and indirectly to different
stochastic degrees.
First of all, via counter-attacks by the transgressor in many ways: political,
economic, military etc. (at least in this conflict, see The Economist, 2014).
Thus from the cybereconomics perspective, the adequate optimization criterion
has to be complex: for example, real economic risk axis, and complementary
imaginary political risk axis. Additionally, complications in this model may come
into game via third-country fuzzy logic and dictators’ infamous moral hazards.
And most importantly—the complexity of the problems increases as, alongside
sanctions to the antagonist, the coalition union has to introduce complementary
domestic economic policies and mechanisms for the minimization of losses
inflicted to the national member economies from the counter-reactions of the
antagonist, and mechanisms for truth-telling in the coalition.
Alas, in the text about the EU sanctions (EU, 2014), we openly cannot find a
smallest measure by the EU to organize complementary domestic counterstrategic
coordination mechanisms, institutions, crisis committees, etc. It seems
that these complex circumstances make hardly a pragmatic normative coordination
quantitative modelling too bad (see, e.g., Schlefer, 2012) but at least it may clarify
the lines of reasoning—for example, why in this kind of complex uncertainties
a MinMax expected loss criteria may be the most adequate; how complex plane
optimization may provide an opportunity to measure the angels/slopes between
alternative vector-risk criterion (economic and political) strategies; and the
missing point that the implementation of international economic sanctions has to
be prepared beforehand domestically, especially in energy security, etc.
The basic existing modern evolutionary heterodox macro-socio-economics and
-cybernetics—even though there are missing financial theories and international
trade theories by Krugman, and others—provides for this special example at least
a three-postulate pillar, which is probably a sufficient methodological framework
for modelling about an optimal coordination of international sanctions for the
group of countries under the condition of complex uncertainties:
1) The consideration of uncertainties and risks in the hierarchical coordination—
and these in the most complicated stochastic cases such as, for example,
Donald Rumsfeld’s “known unknowns”, Bayesian, etc. (on the examples
see Ennuste, 1989) mixed strategies and scenario approaches in the many
stages of game theoretic decentralized/democratic coordinated equilibrium
mechanisms.
2) The modelling of coordinated optimization of socio-economic institutional/
mechanism structural changes and designs (Ennuste, 2003).
3) The consideration of changes in national knowledge structures and
consideration connected with communication moral-hazard risks and
moral coordination (Ennuste, 2008).
All the various contributions of these methodological tools to the implementation
by the agents of optimal strategies and institutional designs in terms of
antagonistic coordinated games are presented in the above-quoted papers by the
author, containing also relevant significant classical source references.
Preliminary conjectures
Firstly, in the case of financial-economic union, the optimal sanctioning of the
third national economy, the specific all-union sanctioning tax for the Member
States (as in the ESM example) should be introduced for solidarity compensation
mechanism (analogous to, e.g., the ESM mechanism, the European Semester
mechanism, etc.) of the union’s members who suffer the worst losses in the
economic sanction war—the war in defence against the escalation of political
and armed aggression.
Secondly, besides other common real factors such as international trade losses
in the sanction wars, also financial and capital losses should be taken into
consideration, as well as losses/gains in the imaginary international credibility
capitals of national societies and losses in the respectability of their political and
knowledge structures.
Thirdly, and most importantly, strict material and moral penalties and restrictions
should be imposed on the institutions/agents who internationally distort national
knowledge structures, authorized under the auspices of the third transgression
state, whether they are resident agents or not—as such distortions prolong the
duration of economic wars with relevant damages to the probabilities of national
sustainability (Ennuste, 2008).
Complex modelling involving indirect relations and feedbacks may lead to
counter-intuitive conclusions. For example, from the aspect of impairment of
Russia’s economy, the Mistral deal may be, with great probability, justified—
and in the example of Estonia, financial restrictions on some Russian capitalfounded
banks may probably give new opportunities to improve the national
balance of payments and international investment position, or a good innovation
in the borderline science parks to develop Russian camps, etc.
For the qualitative measurement of effectiveness of the implied sanctions in the
short term:
1) The speed of national statistical production should be enhanced on the
level of present ICT level.
2) The official national statistical publications have to be made more
transparent and comprehensive, and available to the public. For example,
Estonian Statistical Yearbooks do not contain estimations of the assets of
households (because administrators here are regularly disregarding the
difference between income and wealth/capital (see, e.g., Piketty, 2014).
This, for example, makes a quick assessment of national households’
property losses by cuts in gas supply by the transgressor cumbersome (see
Appendix B).
3) Especially national central banks must openly publish international balances
of payments also in the country by country format, etc. Considering complex
uncertainties (e.g., fuzzy logic of the antagonistic country), it is important
to bear in mind the effectiveness assessments that in these conditions the
diversity of sanctions is as important as the generally moderate degrees of
sanctions—and open possibilities for further bargains.
Last but not least, a key part of the answer to how to minimize maximum
losses for the imposing cooperative camp is to prepare favourable national real
and information environments in advance. To make beforehand the necessary
adjustment processes in foreign trade and foreign financial sectors, first of all
concurrent investments are needed. But also investments in national information
cyber-security and national statistical speed and credibility and sufficient
completeness fields and, which is perhaps the most cumbersome, favourable
preparation in national knowledge and political structures for adequate
cooperative coordination. …“.

Ennuste, Ü. 2012.  “Waiting for the Commission Strengthened Governance Coordination Leviathans: Discourse Memo for the Actors in the Macro-Game “European Semester”- Baltic Journal of European Studies“ Vol 2, No 1, 2012 p 139-164: http://www.ies.ee/iesp/No11/articles/08_Ulo_Ennuste

Ennuste, Ülo. 2008. Synthetic Conceptions of Implementing Mechanisms Design for Public Socio-Economic Information Structure: Illustrative Estonian Examples. Kirch, Aksel; Kerikmäe, Tanel; Talts, Mait (Eds.) Socio-economic and institutional environment: harmonisation in the EU countries of Baltic Sea Rim: a collection of research articles dedicated to the 10th Anniversary of the Institute for European Studies, Tallinn: Tallinn University of Technology:

 http://www.ies.ee/iesp/No4/Ennuste.pdf

Ennuste, Ü. and A. Matin. 1989. Stochastic Adaptive Planning Models and problems of their Coordination. Book, co-author A.Matin, Moscow, “Nauka” (ed Michail Kortsomkin, in Russian):

Стохастические экономические модели адаптивного оптимального планирования и проблемы их координации / Юло Эннусте, Андрей Матин ; отве� Москва : Наука, 1989 95, [2] lk.ISBN/ISSN:  502011937 RR, TLÜAR, TLÜAR teadusrk).

Fuest, Clemens, Thomas Hemmelgarn. 2005. „Corporate tax policy, foreign firm ownership and thin capitalization“ – Regional Science and Urban Economics 35 508– 526.

Abstract

This paper analyzes the implications of foreign firm ownership and international profit shifting

through thin capitalization for corporate tax policy. We consider a model of interjurisdictional tax

competition where the corporate tax serves as a backstop to the personal income tax, interest on debt is

deductible from the corporate tax base and multinational firms may shift profit across countries through

thin capitalization. We show that the problem of thin capitalization induces countries to reduce their

corporate tax rates below the personal income tax rate and to broaden their tax bases. Moreover, foreign

firm ownership leads to a reduction in corporate tax rates.We also show that there is scope for welfare

enhancing tax coordination in our model. In the presence of both foreign firm ownership and thin

capitalization, countries gain from a coordinated increase in corporate tax rates or from a coordinated

broadening of the tax base.

D 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Fukuyama, Francis. 2014. “Political Order and Political Decay” Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 658p.

Hamilton, Carl B. 2005. „Russia’s European economic integration

Escapism and realities“ – Economic Systems 29 294–306.

 Abstract

Russia seeks closer economic ties with EU, and EU is enlarged with 10 new members. Against this background, what future Russia-EU economic relationship is realistic? The paper analyses the enlargement’s effect on trade between Russia, ‘‘old’’ and ‘‘new’’ Europe’s, changes in tariffs and nontariff

barriers, and institutional issues. The reasons why EU and Russia cannot co-operate closer are political (very difficult), economic (probably less difficult), and legal (very difficult on harmonization and dynamics). Political because of different, e.g. geopolitical objectives (mentioned at the end), economic (as reflected in the NTB-section, e.g.) and legal (the impossibility of an CEES).

# 2004 Published by Elsevier B.V.

Kamijo, Y, T. Nihonsugi, A. Takeuchi, Y. Funaki. 2014. „Sustaining cooperation in social dilemmas: Comparison of centralized punishment institutions“ – Games and Economic Behavior 84 (2014) 180–195.

This study investigates two centralized punishment/sanctions institutions  for a linear publik goodis game.

Kissinger, Henry. 2014. „World Order“ Allen Lane, 420p.

Analüüsib maailma poliit-institutsionaalseid disaine ning vastavaid kaasuseid – ei jäta märkimata ka meie 2007 aasta venepronksmäsu aegset venevalitsuse poolest diversioonilist küberrünnakut meie e-riigi vastu kui õppetundi vt: Index lk 408 – Estonia, Russian cyberattac on, 345.

Tõsi – meie ITi mehed näivad sageli hindavat et see rünnak ei vääri vast enam märkimist eriti e-valimiste eelselt sest toimus primitiivsel tehnilisel tasemel.

Nt IT ekspert Jaak Ennuste: „ … DoS rünnakud olid Pronksiöö ajal (mitte DNS, …). Aga … need rünnakud koormavad vaid mingi veebilehe või teenuse üle ja see muutub kättesaamatuks. Aga see rünnak ei muuda ega lisa hääletustulemusi. … Eestis on nii, et kui arvutiga mingi diversiooni pärast valida ei saa, siis lähed jaoskonda ja demokraatia töötab.“

Kuid Kissinger’i selle poliitiliselt tõesti kaaluka raamatu  kontekstis on tuumarelvastuse ajastul mistahes piiriülesed diversioonid teise riigi siseasjadesse globaalse riskiga ning lubamatud – seda eriti seoses – nagu Kissinger peatükis „Cyber Thechnology and World Order“ lk350 väidab – et – Internetiajastul kus valitseb teadete/säutsude välküleküllus ning terrorist-trollide manipulatsioonid jne – paratamatult nii rahvuste arukus/tarkus kui riskiteadmus kärbuvad ning kah võimurite subjektiivne kiskjalik/militaarne otsustusloogika ja moraal võivad hägustuda globaalriskiliselt mitte-kompromislikuks – kui lastakse … (vt raamatust vastavat pragmaatilist pt lk 371-375 ).

P.S.: Nobelist Professor H.  Kissinger (s 1923; Nobelist 1972) on olnud rahvusvaheliste tuumarelvakokkulepete pea-arhitekte – kuid ilmselt alates Putin’ist need kokkulepped enam ei pea ja seega ka Kissinger’i hinnangud selles monograafias totaalse tuumasõja puhkemise peaaegu 0-tõenäsusele ei pruugi enam paika pidada. Muide tänavu on Oxford university’s Future of Humanity Institute and the Global Challenges Foundation on välja tulnud apokalüptilise 0,005% hüpoteesiga (TF.com 13.II 15).

Laar, Mart. 2015(?). “PÖÖRE”. READ OÜ. Tallinn, 400lk.

Narvas 2003 putinoidliku separaatautonoomia referendumi üritamine tugines nii Kremlipoolsel ajaloovõltsingutel okupatsiooni suhtes (vt ka “Valge raamat …” 2005) ja Laar väidab nagu oleks selle taga onud ka Putin’ite perekondlik viha eestlaste vastu ja esitab legendi nagu oleks Putin’i isa olnud sõja ajal punapartisan Saksa rinde tagalas kus eestlastest talupere olla neid retnud (vt lk231).

Lordide Koda. 2015. HOUSE OF LORDS HL Paper 115: „The EU and Russia: before and beyond   the crisis in Ukraine“:

http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201415/ldselect/ldeucom/115/115.pdf

Väga suurele ekspertide konsiiliumile tuginev ning täpsete osundustega varustatud analüüs – fokusseeritud UK rakursist ratsionaalse EU poolse välispoliitika disainimisele Venemaa suhtes

Nt katke  lk69-74:

„ … In December, the Minister for Europe confirmed that sanctions were an “additional burden on top of the grievous structural weaknesses that Russia already faces”, which had been laid bare by the collapse of global crude oil prices. The “tangible impact upon Russia” had been that the rouble had hit historic lows, headline inflation outstripped wage inflation for the first time in five years, growth forecasts had been revised downwards to near zero for the current and next quarter, and borrowing costs had spiralled as Russia was locked out of western financial markets.377

  1. By October 2014, witnesses had begun to estimate a two to three year crunch period for the Russian economy. Professor Guriev said that the sanctions had worsened the economic difficulties for the Russian budget caused by falling oil prices. The price of oil would hit Russian public finances and this effect would be “strongly reinforced by the sanctions.” Oil prices in the range of $80 or $85 directly implied that the Russian government would face “significant problems three years down the road.”378 In November, Mr Kasyanov too thought that if oil prices stayed as they were President Putin had “two years to decide what to do.”379 We note that, by January 2015, crude oil prices had further fallen to under $50 per barrel, with implications for the timeline suggested by our witnesses.
  2. It was less clear whether the sanctions were having a political impact in Ukraine. On 24 July 2014, commenting on the asset freezes and visa bans, Sir Tony Brenton judged not. He said that sanctions were “not having any political effect at all.”380 By September, after the imposition of three-tier economic sanctions, Mr Crompton believed that sanctions had an impact on President Putin’s calculations: “Every time the EU has applied sanctions over the past few months, on the day before Russia has made some diplomatic gesture in an effort to avoid further sanctions”.381 Professor Guriev agreed that sanctions had driven a change in the President’s political calculations in eastern Ukraine. The ceasefire and Russia’s willingness to moderate its support for separatists in eastern Ukraine were evidence of sanctions working. He put it to us that President Putin “does understand the numbers”, which is why Donetsk and Luhansk “even after holding a referendum, have not become part of Russia.”382
  3. In contrast, we heard that sanctions had not so far changed President Putin’s calculations in Crimea. Professor Guriev said that Russia was not going to

375 Q 58

376 ‘Russia sees higher capital outflows with ruble near record level’, Bloomberg (17 November 2014): http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014–11-17/russia-sees-higher-capital-outflows-with-ruble-near-record-level [accessed 2 February 2015]

377 Q 256

378 Q 77

379 Q 222

380 Q 44

381 Q 59

382 QQ 85, 77

70 THE EU AND RUSSIA: BEFORE AND BEYOND THE CRISIS IN UKRAINE

give back Crimea “any time soon.”383 According to Dr Tom Casier, Jean Monnet Chair, Senior Lecturer in International Relations, University of Kent, the Russian government was trapped by its own nationalist rhetoric. The Russians would be “willing to hurt themselves … for the simple reason that Putin and the elite have identified their position so much with power and Russian pride that it will be very hard to force them, by sanctions or whatever, to step back.”384

  1. Dr Libman argued that the Russian leadership divided issues into first-order priorities, such as national security (where it pursued its policies with determination and rigour), and second-order issues, such as the economy and domestic issues (where the Russian leadership was flexible and able to compromise). Even major economic difficulties did not move the Russian leadership on first-order security issues.385
  2. As for whether sanctions would bring the Russian government to the negotiating table, in September 2014 Mr Crompton said that sanctions had actively targeted the group of oligarchs and senior businessmen surrounding the Kremlin, and that there was “quite a lot of evidence” that that group of people were “very concerned.”386 In December, the Minister for Europe was frank that sanctions were not yet bringing about a change in President Putin’s actions regarding Ukraine, but he pointed to “dissension within the Russian elite”, and “very senior people inside the Russian system” who believed that the President was taking Russia in the wrong direction.387
  3. In addition, some witnesses drew our attention to the unintended consequences of sanctions. Professor Guriev said that as the Russian economy stuttered, the Russian government would “have to come up with certain—probably non-economic—solutions to convince Russians … that they are suffering economically for a good cause.” In his view, “we should expect more propaganda, more repression and maybe even further foreign policy adventures.” He added that the Russian government was using sanctions to “call Russians to rally around the flag.”388
  4. Sectoral sanctions were also driving the Russian economy towards more protectionism. Mr Kliment told us that in response to the threat of increased sanctions, Russia had taken a number of steps that prepared the economy to become “more autarchic rather than more open to western trade and European norms.”389 Dr Libman predicted that the Russian economy would “enter a lengthy period of stagnation and lose its chances to modernise.”390 Sir Tony Brenton viewed the ending of European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) funding streams to Russia as one of the “more ludicrous sanctions”, as it would end support for small private enterprises in

 

383 Q 77

384 Q 116

385 Written evidence (RUS0015)

386 Q 59

387 Q 256

388 Q 77

389 Q 22

390 Written evidence (RUS0015)

THE EU AND RUSSIA: BEFORE AND BEYOND THE CRISIS IN UKRAINE 71

Russia, which were “exactly the component in Russian society that we want to develop if we are thinking about Russia post-Putin.”391

 

391 Q 50

392 Written evidence (RUS0010)

393 Q 78

394 Q 90

395 Written evidence (RUS0010)

396 Q 58

397 Written evidence (RUS0010)

Impact of sanctions in the EU

  1. Sanctions on Russia have also imposed economic hardship on EU countries. The Confederation of British Industry (CBI) drew our attention to trading statements from publicly listed companies that cited geopolitical tensions in Ukraine and Russia as a contributing factor to downgrading performance forecasts for 2015.392 Professor Guriev pointed out that in the fragile state of the EU economy, while sanctions against Russia and counter-sanctions by Russia had not had a dramatic effect, they had “had a negative effect on European growth perspectives.”393
  2. Ms Shona Riach, Director, International Finance, Her Majesty’s Treasury, acknowledged the impact of sanctions on the Eurozone, but added that the biggest risk to the European economy was “the geopolitical threat and the threat from the situation in Ukraine, rather than specifically the impact of the sanctions.” It followed that “not to do anything and not to take action would have had greater costs associated with it.”394
  3. The CBI informed us that Russian ‘retaliatory’ sanctions, such as banning the import of agricultural goods from the EU, had a significant direct impact on EU countries, particularly in Eastern Europe. The stockpiling of some agricultural products in EU countries as a result of the Russian import ban had put a downward pressure on commodity prices across the EU as a whole.395 Mr Barton told us that the total value of the EU food exports that were affected was “about £4.5 billion, which will mainly affect Lithuania, Poland and Germany.”396
  4. The economic impact of sanctions on the UK has been limited. Overall, CBI members believed that the sanctions had so far “been carefully designed to limit the impact on British companies while maximising the impact on the Russian economy.” According to the CBI, the impact of Russian retaliatory sanctions on the agricultural sector had also been limited. The UK exported a relatively small amount of agricultural products to Russia—in 2013 the UK’s largest agricultural exports to Russia were £5.4 million of cheese and £1.4 million of poultry meat—accounting for less than 1% of the UK’s total cheese and poultry trade. However, the stockpiling of agricultural products in EU countries, and downward pressure on commodity prices across the EU, had caused a consequent impact on British companies and suppliers exposed to these commodity markets.397
  5. There has been a more severe impact on the German economy. Open Europe informed us that German trade with Russian had declined significantly between August 2013 and August 2014—exports had fallen

 

72 THE EU AND RUSSIA: BEFORE AND BEYOND THE CRISIS IN UKRAINE

26% and imports 19%.398 Russia currently takes 3% of Germany’s exports. The decline in German-Russia trade has contributed to a broader fall in German exports. In the second quarter of the current financial year the German economy shrank by 0.2%. Economists expected it to contract again in the third quarter, meaning that the economy would technically be in recession.399

 

398 Written evidence (RUS0013)

399 ‘Why the German economy is in a rut’, The Economist (21 October 2014): http://www.economist.com/ blogs/economist-explains/2014/10/economist-explains-14 [accessed 2 February 2015]

400 Appendix 5: Evidence taken during visit to Berlin

401 Q 96

402 Q 12

403 Q 98

The future of the sanctions policy

  1. The EU’s asset-freezes and travel bans on individuals are due to be reviewed by the EU in March and April 2015, while the sectoral sanctions come up for renewal in July 2015.
  2. We understood from our conversations in Berlin and in Brussels that there was growing frustration that the EU’s offer of dialogue was not being reciprocated by Russia. In particular, we sensed the growing impatience and disappointment in Germany. Dr Lucas told us that, in light of the slow progress on Crimea, the Federal Foreign Office was considering whether tougher sanctions should be developed. The opinion of Dr Markus Kerber, Director General, Federation of German Industries, was that some Member States tended to be of the view that if Russia’s behaviour had not worsened then the sanctions should be lifted. The German position was that if Russia’s behaviour had not improved, then the sanctions should continue.400
  3. Ms Riach noted that at both UK and EU levels thought was being given to how sanctions could be tightened further. The financial sanctions had “a number of exemptions within them”, and the first thing that could be done “would be to look at tightening that up as far as possible.”401 Other witnesses drew attention to the possibility of targeting the Russian government more closely. Mr Ian Bond CVO, Director of Foreign Policy, Centre for European Reform, suggested that the EU had been “very gentle so far”, and that the majority of those sanctioned so far were “utterly unknown figures in local politics in Crimea or relatively middle-ranking military officers.” The EU had not done what the US had done, which was “to target those who are closest to Putin, which is likely to be more effective as a short-term measure.”402
  4. Mr Kara-Murza too suggested that the EU should target individuals close to President Putin. Such a step would have enormous political significance for the President and his entourage. In his view there was “nothing or very little that the Putin regime fears more than targeted personal sanctions imposed by the European Union and North America—by the West in general—on the people in Putin’s inner circle.”403 Mr Kasyanov agreed that there could be

THE EU AND RUSSIA: BEFORE AND BEYOND THE CRISIS IN UKRAINE 73

space to increase sanctions to named individuals, including members of parliament nominated by President Putin.404

  1. Mr Kara-Murza also suggested that the generic term “sanctions against Russia” resonated badly among the Russian public: “It allows Mr Putin to portray these individual sanctions as being directed not against his oligarchs and his officials, but against the whole of Russian society.” He said that it was “really crucial to choose the language carefully and to talk not about ‘sanctions on Russia,’ but about sanctions on the regime, on the corrupt officials, on the human rights abusers, on the aggressors and so forth.” The shorthand was “easier to say”, but it was “very important to say those few extra words and not play into Mr Putin’s propaganda.”405
  2. In the long term, Dr Lucas argued that sanctions needed to be part of an overall strategy, in which the EU would be closely aligned with the US.406 Mr Barton assured us that there had deliberately been a “very close alignment” between what the EU and the US were doing, and that there was agreement that this approach should be maintained.407 The Minister informed us that the Prime Minister had “personally worked very hard” to ensure that the EU and US sanctions regimes were as consistent as possible.408

 

404 Q 230

405 Q 102

406 Appendix 5: Evidence taken during visit to Berlin

407 Q 60

408 Q 256

Conclusions

  1. We welcome Member States uniting around an ambitious package of sanctions on Russia.
  2. Sanctions need to be part of an overall strategy of diplomacy and a political process, including intensive dialogue on Crimea. This strategy is not yet in place.
  3. The Russian government is under severe pressure. Internal economic problems, including the falling price of oil, have been worsened by the EU sanctions regime, and are likely to have a very serious impact on the viability of the current government. However, the EU is in danger of having offered President Putin a tool for fomenting further nationalist and anti-EU sentiment.
  4. There is no evidence that sanctions have caused President Putin to shift his stance on Crimea, where Russia has direct and vital security interests through the Sevastopol naval base.
  5. While EU and US sanctions have been broadly aligned, the US has been prepared to target individuals close to the Russian government. If there is no progress on the Minsk Protocol and the situation in eastern Ukraine continues to deteriorate, the EU should find ways of targeting individuals close to President Putin and consider broadening sectoral sanctions into the Russian financial sector. 74 THE EU AND RUSSIA: BEFORE AND BEYOND THE CRISIS IN UKRAINE
  6. In the long-term, three-tier sanctions are detrimental to the EU’s interests as well as to Russia’s. While they could be renewed in the short term, the prospect of the progressive removal of sanctions should be part of the EU’s negotiating position. Genuine progress by Russia in delivering the ceasefire in eastern Ukraine should be the basis for ratcheting down sanctions. … “

Teadusuuringud – näiteid:

Makoto Shimoji, Paul Schweinzer. 2015. „Implementation without incentive compatibility: Twostories with partially informed planners“ – Games and Economic Behavior, v1. 149.
 Miguel Aramendia, QuanWen. 2014. „Justifiable punishments in repeated games“ – Games and Economic Behavior,  88  6–28.
Kerry, John. 2015. http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/amerika/kerry-greift-moskau-wegen-ukraine-konflikts-mit-scharfen-worten-an-13448399.html?fb_action_ids=870825232961154&fb_action_types=og.shares

“Valge raamat: Eesti rahva kaotustest okupatsioonide läbi 1940-1991” (peatoim Vello Salo). 2005. Okupatsioonide Repressiivpoliitika Uurimise Riiklik Komisjon, Eesti Entsüklopeediakirjastus, Tallinn:

http://digar.nlib.ee/digar/show/?id=8196

Ott, A.F. and Ennuste, U. 1996. Anxiety as a Consequence of Liberalization: an Analysis of Opinion Surveys in Estonia. – Social Science Journal, 33, 2, 149-164:

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleListURL&_method=list&_ArticleListID=-6768

VÉRON, NICOLAS AND GUNTRAM B. WOLFF. APRIL 2015. „CAPITAL MARKETS UNION:A VISION FOR THE LONG TERM“- Bruegel Policy Contributions:

http://www.bruegel.org/publications/publication-detail/publication/878-capital-markets-union-a-vision-for-the-long-term/

Wiener, Norbert. 1948. “Cybernetics or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine” The Technology Press.

E.k “Küberneetika” 1961 toim Helmut Riikoja, Tallinn 243lk.

NB!: Küberneetika Isa eristab küberneetika kahte tiiba: juhtimis-teoreetilist ((JT) sh nt poliitilist- või strateegilist-küberneetikat (SK)) ja kommunikatsioon-tehnoloogilist tiiba (IT). Seejuures Masina mõiste alla kuuluvad ka küberneetilised teaduspõhised natsionaalsed kordineerimismehhanismid sootsiumi tasakaalustatud evolutsioonilise arengu (homöostaas) riskide vähendamiseks – arvestades võimalikke inimlikke moraaliriske (kaabaklikus nt informatsiooniga manipuleerimisel väheminformeeritud partnerite alttõmbamiseks või ka mehhanismides kommunikatsiooni moraali-riskilisel erapoolikul subjektiivsel agregeerimisel jne).

 

mai 4, 2015 - Posted by | Uncategorized

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