Ülo Ennuste majandusartiklid

Memo 26.VII 17

ELi Nõukogu Eesti Eesistumiese Agenda* Peatükk III „Turvaline ja kaitstud Euroopa Liit“ –
nõuab ilmtingimata parajasti hübriidsõja tingimustes võimalike rahvuslike ning ka liiduliste katastroofide ning kriiside põhjuste mõistmist ja nende vältimise teaduspõhist sotsiaal-küberneetilist käsitlust – õnneks vastav akadeemiline uurimine ja publitseerimine näib viimastel aastakümnetel lausa vohavat – nii retrospektiivselt kui prospektiivselt (vt nt ScienceDirect.com kümneid tuhandeid vastavaid värskeid publikatsioone** – mis paari klikiga üldiselt odavalt kättesaadaval – ja – saaks meie Eesistujatele suureks abiks olla – eriti Teadus- ja Rahandus-Ministritele) – mis eetiliselt (mitte populistlikult ja partokraatlikult) käsitlevad nii vastavaid võimalikke olulisi riske kui ka nende tagajärgede ratsionaalse leevendamise võimalusi (sh nii rahvusliku sotsiaalkapitalide kui ka teadmusvarade edendamisega) ning liikmesriikide rahvuslike jätkusuutlikkuse kestlikkuste tõenäosuste harmoonilist optimeerimist.

*) http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/presidency-council-eu/ – Lk. 18 lõik:

” … Estonia supports and contributes to the discussions on
Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) and
a European Defence Action Plan (EDAP). Estonia supports the Commission’s initiatives, in particular in
the field of defence research and development and in strengthening the European defence industrial
base in order to create better opportunities for involving and
funding the small and medium size enterprises operating in the sector.
In a new security environment, identifying hybrid threats, increasing the awareness of such threats and stepping up resilience measures have become essential to enable
timely responses to threats. Estonia continues to contribute to the European Union’s early warning system and to promote exchanges of experience between institutions and
Member States. All the tools at the disposal of the European Union and NATO are required to tackle hybrid
and cyber threats. Estonia supports EU-NATO cooperation through practical actions in accordance
with the EU-NATO joint declaration of 2016 and contributes to the cooperation objectives in the field of cyber defence, including organising mutually open and coordinated
exercises.” (Pt III lõpp)

**) https://yloennuste.wordpress.com/2017/07/24/sotsiaal-kuber-kiri-24-vii-17/

P.S.: ilmselt moodsa sotsiaal-küberneetika valgusel tuleb “turvalisuse ja kaitstuse” kriteeriumeid täiendada veel heidutuse kriteeriumiga ning elanike hirmu faktori (katastroofide võimalikkus) ilmutatud arvestamisega – vt nt:

Chichilnisky, Graciela (2009) „The topology of fear“ – Journal of Mathematical Economics, 45: 807–816: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jmateco

Ab s t r a c t

For many years experimental observations have raised questions about the rationality of

economic agents—for example, the Allais Paradox or the Equity Premium Puzzle. The problem is a narrow notion of rationality that disregards fear. This article extends the notion

of rationality with new axioms of choice under uncertainty and the decision criteria they

imply (Chichilnisky, G., 1996a. An axiomatic approach to sustainable development. Social

Choice andWelfare 13, 257–321; Chichilnisky, G., 2000. An axiomatic approach to choice

under uncertainty with Catastrophic risks. Resource and Energy Economics; Chichilnisky,

G., 2002. Catastrophical Risk. Encyclopedia of Environmetrics, vol. 1. John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.,


In the absence of catastrophes, the old and the newapproach coincide, and both

lead to standard expected utility. A sharp difference emerges when facing rare events with

important consequences, or catastrophes. Theorem 1 establishes that a classic axiom of

choice under uncertainty – Arrow’s Monotone Continuity axiom, or its relatives introduced

by DeGroot, Villegas, Hernstein and Milnor – postulate rational behavior that is ‘insensitive’

to rare events as defined in (Chichilnisky, G., 1996a. An axiomatic approach to sustainable

development. Social Choice andWelfare 13, 257–321; Chichilnisky, G., 2000. An axiomatic

approach to choice under uncertainty with Catastrophic risks. Resource and Energy Economics; Chichilnisky, G., 2002. Catastrophical Risk. Encyclopedia of Environmetrics, vol. 1.

John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., Chicester). Theorem 2 replaces this axiom with another that allows

extreme responses to extreme events, and characterizes the implied decision criteria as a

combination of expected utility with extremal responses.

Theorems 1 and 2 offer a new understanding of rationality consistent with previously unexplained observations about decisions involving rare and catastrophic events, decisions involving fear, the Equity Premium Puzzle, ‘jump diffusion’ processes and ‘heavy tails’, and it agrees with (Debreu, G., 1953. Valuation equilibrium and Pareto optimum. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 40, 588–592) formulation of market behavior and his proof of Adam Smith’s Invisible Hand theorem.

© 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.


Robert S. Pindyck, Robert S. and Neng Wang (2013) „The Economic and Policy Consequences of Catastrophes“ – American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 5(4): 306–339: http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/pol.5.4.306


How likely is a catastrophic event that would substantially reduce

the capital stock, GDP, and wealth? How much should society be

willing to pay to reduce the probability or impact of a catastrophe?

We answer these questions and provide a framework for policy

analysis using a general equilibrium model of production, capital

accumulation, and household preferences. Calibrating the model to

economic and financial data, we estimate the mean arrival rate of

shocks and their size distribution, the tax on consumption society

would accept to limit the maximum size of a catastrophic shock, and

the cost to insure against its impact. (JEL D81, E22, E23, E32, G22,

H25, Q54)


Fleurbaey, Marc; Stéphane Zuber (2017) „Fair management of social risk“ – Journal ofEconomicTheory, 169): 666–706:  http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jet



We provide a general method for extending social preferences defined for riskless economic environments to the context of risk and uncertainty. We apply the method to the problems of managing unemployment allowances (in the context of macroeconomic fluctuations) and catastrophic risks (in the context of climate change). The method guarantees expost fairness and pays attention to individuals’ risk attitudes, while ensuring rationality properties for social preferences, revisiting basic ideas from Harsanyi’s celebrated ag-gregation theorem (Harsanyi, 1955). The social preferences that we obtain do not always take the form of an expected utility criterion, but they always satisfy statewise dominance. When we require social preferences to be expected utilities, we obtain a variant of Harsanyi’s result under a weak version of the Pareto principle, and a maximin criterion under a stronger Pareto requirement, whenever the expost social ordering does not depend on people’s risk attitudes. We also show how non-expected utility individual preferences can be accommodated in the approach.

©2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

NB!: asjatundjale meeldetuletuseks et nt ülaltoodu alusel sotsiaal-küberneetiliselt näib et kremlistide ratsionaalsus on inimkonnale katastroofiks – nagu oli ka Stalin’i ratsionaalsus:  vt nt Gregory, Paul R., Philipp J.H. Schröder, Konstantin Sonin (2011) „Rational dictators and the killing of innocents: Data from Stalin’s archives“ – Journal of Comparative Economics 39 (2011) 34–42. 

Ja  Chanel, Oliver; Graciela Chichilnisky (2013) „Valuing life: Experimental evidence using sensitivity to rare events“ – Ecological Economics 85: 198–205: doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2012.03.004

Chanel, Oliver; Graciela Chichilnisky (2013) „Valuing life: Experimental evidence using sensitivity to rare events“ – Ecological Economics 85: 198–205: doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2012.03.004


A b s t r a c t

Global environmental phenomena like climate change, major extinction events or flutype pandemics can have catastrophic consequences. By properly assessing the outcomes involved – especially those concerning human life – economic theory of choice under uncertainty is expected to help people take the best decision. However, the widely used expected utility theory values life in terms of the low probability of death someone

would be willing to accept in order to receive extra payment. Common sense and experimental evidence refute this way of valuing life, and here we provide experimental evidence of people’s unwillingness to accept a low probability of death, contrary to expected utility predictions. This work uses new axioms of choice defined by Chichilnisky (2000), especially an axiom that allows extreme responses to extreme events, and the choice criterion that they imply (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2004). The implied decision criteria are a combination of expected utility

with extreme responses, and seem more consistent with observations.

© 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.


P.S.P.S.: teatavasti ELi Lissaboni Strateegia üks olulisemaid üleskutseid oli ja siiani on:

kutsub kõiki liikmesriike üles kohustuma kevadisel [2005] Euroopa Ülemkogul võtma

meetmeid, mida on vaja, et tõsta kulutusi uurimis- ja arendustegevusele vähemalt 3 %-ni

riigi tuludest (2% era- ja 1% avalikule sektorile), kindlustades samal ajal kõikide

edendamismeetmete kontrollimise Lissaboni eesmärkide suhtes; rõhutab, et samas

seoses tuleb kahekordistada uurimis- ja arendustegevusele antavaid Euroopa rahalisi

vahendeid kooskõlas Lissaboni eesmärkidega, sealhulgas kiita heaks Euroopa

teadusnõukogu kui sõltumatu teadusküsimuste nõuandekomitee loomine;“


Kahetsusväärselt Eurostati viimaste andmete järgi* 2016 EL/28 oli selle indikaatori osas keskmiselt saavutatud tase ainult 2% . Ning veelgi kahetsusväärsemalt Eesti osas mahajäämus veelgi suurem – ligikaudu 1,5%: seega kui ELis keskmiselt kulutati 2016 aastal 2010 püsihindades keskmiselt elaniku kohta ligikaudu 0,6 tuhat eurot ja Soomes ligemale tuhat eurot p.c – siis Eestis keskmiselt ainult 0,3 tuhat eurot: mida oleks meie Eesistujatel enesekiitlemise puhul sobiv arvestada.


*) http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/europe-2020-indicators/europe-2020-strategy/headline-indicators-scoreboard


juuli 26, 2017 - Posted by | Uncategorized

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