Nõudlusinflatsioon
Nõudlusinflatsioon
Kui rahvusliku majanduse üldpakkumine ei jõua üldnõudlusele järele siis hinnad tõusevad (ceteris paribus) – tekib nn nõudlustõmbeline inflatsioon – ja just see näib praegu meil eeskätt toimuvat (vt lisaks nt Mereste 2003).
Ja et miks Eesti majanduse pakkumise pool ei jõua praegu järele eeskätt välisnõudluse poolsele tärkavale tõusule, see on hästi lahtikirjutatud EL Komisjoni Sügisprognoosi* järgmises lõigus lk 82:
“However, the
question remains of how much spare potential is
left in the economy, given that part of the existing
production capacity may no longer be usable after
the crisis and the readjustment of the economy.
The crisis also probably impacted on the level of
potential growth. The extent to which the current
high level of unemployment becomes structural
will be a significant determinant of potential
growth in the medium and long term. In addition,
the contribution to potential growth from capital
accumulation, while gradually rising, will remain
substantially lower than during the peak years of
the previous cycle, including due to servicing
accumulated liabilities. The contribution to growth
from improvements in technology, which was
likewise very high during the peak years of the
cycle, is highly uncertain looking forward. Overall,
this implies that potential growth will stay rather
subdued in Estonia in the coming years, reaching
barely a third of its pre-crisis rate in the medium
term”
Sõnaga – Eesti majanduse potentsiaalne kasv ehk pakkumise pool jääb lähiaastatel madalaks, seda eeskätt selle tõttu et oluline osa masu töötutest on tööturult pöördumatult lahkunud ning osa kapitalidest/kasumitest on masuga kaduma läinud või kodumaisest majandusest välja kanditud. Seega lähiaastatel on Eestis oodata pakkumispoolset hinnatõusu, sest suhteliselt oluliselt sügavama majanduslangusega kui enamikul parterriikidel on Eesti majandusel arusaadavalt suhteliselt aeglasem ja heitlikum tõus kui enamikel partner-riikidel – kellede nõudlusee tõus ka madalama languse töttu varem tärkab ja ka meieni ulatub.
PS: see et suheliselt sügavamat majanduslangust põhjustab eeskätt suheliselt käpardlikum majanduspoliitika koos suhteliselt ebakvaliteetsema majandusmudeliga – see vist ei vaja enam ülekordamist.
*************************************************************************EL *Komisjoni Sügisprognoosi Eesti pt ilma tabeliteta:
6. ESTONIA
Post-crisis acceleration of growth
80
Robust growth since end-2009…
Following seven consecutive quarters of decline,
the Estonian economy turned to positive quarterly
growth at the end of 2009 and reached positive
annual growth rates by mid-2010. Quarterly
growth was particularly robust in the second
quarter of 2010, when it reached 1.9% (seasonally
and working day adjusted), the fastest since early
2007, while annual growth reached 4.7% in the
third quarter of the year, according to the latest
available information. The prospects of euro
adoption in 2011, confirmed in July 2010, have
been clearly supportive for overall confidence in
the Estonian economy.
So far the main contribution to growth has come
from external trade, as Estonia’s main export
partners – in particular Sweden, but also euro-area
economies, the other Baltics and Russia – have
been growing more strongly than previously
expected. The flexible nature of the Estonian
economy and the availability of factors of
production allowed Estonia to benefit promptly
from this rebound. The adjustment in costs that
took place in 2009 also contributed to the
improved competitiveness of the economy,
allowing Estonia to increase its share in global
trade.
While exports provided the main growth stimulus,
domestic demand continued to act as a drag on the
economy until mid-2010, with the exception of
stocks. The latter, extensively run down during
crisis years, were rebuilt to support expanding
external demand, contributing strongly to overall
growth in the first half of 2010. Resumption of
growth in fixed investment has been uneven, with
a firmer recovery in investment in equipment. On
the other hand, government investment was lower
than expected in the first half of 2010.
…is expected to continue in the short term,
with stronger demand contributing to some
reversal in the current account…
External demand is expected to remain one of the
principal determinants of growth in 2011 and
2012, with exports growing broadly in line with
demand growth in Estonia’s main export markets.
Private consumption is projected to start
supporting the recovery towards the end of 2010,
even though the full-year contribution will likely
remain negative. While positive annual growth is
expected to resume in 2011-12, it will remain
significantly below levels observed in pre-crisis
years. Nevertheless, private consumption is set to
benefit from demand that has been postponed due
to high precautionary saving during the crisis, in
particular in 2009, while growth in household
disposable income is expected to turn positive
from 2011. The household saving rate, while
decreasing, should remain positive over the
forecast horizon, contrary to the pre-crisis trend, as
households continue to repay accumulated
liabilities. Uncertainty around the saving behaviour
of households constitutes one of major risks to the
forecast, both on the upside and on the downside.
As with private consumption, fixed investment is
set to reach positive year-on-year growth by the
end of 2010. The growth in investment is expected
to accelerate in 2011 and remain robust in 2012.
Increasing external and domestic demand can be
satisfied partly by redeploying existing capacity:
although the utilisation rate reached its long-term
average by the third quarter of 2010, surveys still
point to availability of spare capacity. However, it
is likely that some available capacity, which will
not be suitable to support the new growth phase
given ongoing shifts in the output mix, will need to
be replaced. This implies an acceleration
in equipment investment in the short term, in
particular for new product lines. The extent to
which fixed investment rebounds following the
enormous contraction in 2008-2009 depends
Member States, Estonia
81
largely on financial sector confidence and lending
policy, as well as on the firming of the economic
outlook, thus constituting another uncertainty in
the forecast.
Recovery in both external and internal demand has
led to a pickup in import growth rates. This trend
is expected to continue in 2011 and 2012, reducing
somewhat the high level of current-account surplus
recorded in 2009. Moreover, recovering
profitability of companies in foreign ownership
will lead to a larger income account shortfall, with
a significant part of these profits being reinvested.
Overall this is expected to lead to annual GDP
growth higher than what was predicted in the
previous forecast, at 2.4% in 2010, accelerating to
4.4% in 2011 and at 3.5% in 2012. This growth
acceleration reflects a re-employment of available
production capacity, both capital and labour, but
also new investment.
…but can it be sustained in the medium and
long term?
The current growth acceleration largely relates to
the closure of the significant negative output gap
that emerged as a result of a combination of the
global financial crisis and reversal of the domestic
cycle. The negative output gap is estimated to be
over 10% of GDP in 2009, twice the level reached
during the recession in the late 90s. However, the
question remains of how much spare potential is
left in the economy, given that part of the existing
production capacity may no longer be usable after
the crisis and the readjustment of the economy.
The crisis also probably impacted on the level of
potential growth. The extent to which the current
high level of unemployment becomes structural
will be a significant determinant of potential
growth in the medium and long term. In addition,
the contribution to potential growth from capital
accumulation, while gradually rising, will remain
substantially lower than during the peak years of
the previous cycle, including due to servicing
accumulated liabilities. The contribution to growth
from improvements in technology, which was
likewise very high during the peak years of the
cycle, is highly uncertain looking forward. Overall,
this implies that potential growth will stay rather
subdued in Estonia in the coming years, reaching
barely a third of its pre-crisis rate in the medium
term.
Further challenges: labour market…
After peaking at 20.4% in early 2010,
unemployment (15-64) started to decline very
rapidly to 19.2% by the spring and 15.7% at end-
September. Job creation has been high since March
2010, highlighting the flexibility of the labour
market and the quality and speed of job
intermediation. The fall in unemployment is
expected to decelerate during the winter months,
before gaining pace again later in 2011, in line
with the projected acceleration in growth. In 2009,
nominal hourly wages contracted by around 3%
for the whole economy, while hourly wages in
public administration declined by around 5%. This
decline has, however, reversed in 2010 and
moderate nominal wage growth can be expected in
both 2011 and 2012.
Efforts are being made to further raise the
effectiveness of active labour market policies, in
particular: job mediation and job search guidance
efforts; measures to support job creation and
recruitment; and measures to preserve or restore
employability. Nevertheless, structural
unemployment is set to continue to rise in Estonia
over the forecast horizon, potentially leading to
premature wage pressures. In addition, the
availability of employment opportunities in other
EU countries could lead to a fall in the
economically active population, exposing
bottlenecks as labour demand rises.
…and rising prices
After a very low consumer price increase (0.2%) in
2009, HICP inflation has been on an upward trend
since the beginning of 2010. While initially the
increase mostly related to surges in energy prices,
including hikes in excise duties from July 2009
and January 2010, food prices have also started to
increase since early 2010. The latter reflected not
only a rise in global food prices, but increasingly
also a magnified domestic response to global
trends, possibly related to corporate intentions of
restoring profit margins after substantial losses,
small market size and the prevalence of short-term
contracts. Furthermore, growing food exports to
Russia, following adverse weather conditions there
in summer 2010, have reduced domestic supply in
Estonia.
Overall, global commodity price developments and
more limited domestic price pressures are expected
to lead to inflation of 2.7% in 2010, which is
expected to accelerate to 3.6% in 2011 before
European Economic Forecast, Autumn 2010
82
moderating to 2.3% in 2012. Domestic factors are
set to play an increasingly prominent role in price
developments in 2011 and 2012. Given the history
of relatively high inflation in Estonia prior to the
last downturn, there is a risk that current inflation
developments may affect expectations and, hence,
weigh on private consumption and recovery.
Public finances: uneven pattern in coming
years but overall sound
As a result of adverse economic developments in
2008 and 2009, tax revenue fell, while general
government expenditure as a share of GDP
increased by over 10 pps. in two years, reaching
a high of 45% of GDP in 2009. Comprehensive
fiscal consolidation, implemented especially from
the second half of 2009, helped to limit the
deterioration of public finances and was achieved
though a combination of permanent measures,
which constituted around two-thirds of total
consolidation, and some temporary measures to
deal with the more extreme – but also temporary –
effects of the crisis. As the economy improves,
some of these temporary measures will start to
expire. This in particular relates to the resumption
of state contributions to the funded mandatory
pension scheme and to lower dividends from stateowned
companies in 2011 and 2012, compared to
their level in 2009 and 2010. However, this
reversal is not expected to lead to a pronounced
deterioration in public finances.
The near-term fiscal outlook is markedly affected
by sizeable sales of so-called “Kyoto units”(71).
These transactions, signed in the course of 2010,
considerably improve the outlook for public
finances in that year, while environmental
investments funded by the sales will have an
opposite impact in 2011 and 2012. Without the
impact of those sales, the headline general
government deficit would have been fairly stable
over the forecast period, at 2.0% of GDP in 2010,
1.6% in 2011 and 2.1% in 2012.
The outlook for the general government debt level,
which increases to 11.7% of GDP in 2012, reflects
an assumption that the deficit will be fully
financed by new borrowing, although in practice
part of the deficit could be financed through
running down existing reserves.
(71) An Assigned Amount Unit (AAU) is a tradable ‘Kyoto unit’
or ‘carbon credit’ representing an allowance to emit
greenhouse gases. AAUs are issued up to the level
specified in Annex 1 Party to the Kyoto Protocol. Due to
the initial comparison basis, Estonia received a higher
quota amount than needed given the current structure of the
economy, and is able to sell the surplus of the CO2 quota
allocated for the 2008-2012 commitment period.
4 kommentaari »
Leave a reply to Ülo Ennuste Tühista vastus
-
Värske
-
Viited
-
Arhiiv
- juuli 2022 (1)
- juuni 2022 (1)
- aprill 2022 (3)
- märts 2022 (2)
- jaanuar 2022 (3)
- detsember 2021 (1)
- november 2021 (2)
- august 2021 (2)
- mai 2021 (1)
- detsember 2020 (1)
- august 2020 (2)
- juuni 2020 (2)
-
Kategooriad
-
RSS
Entries RSS
Comments RSS
Alternatiivne tõlgendus oleks, et laenurahal ja otsestel välisinvesteeringutel toimunud majanduskasv, mida vedas paljuski kinnisvarasektor (ja sellega vahetult seotud tootmine), ei olnud pärast odava laenuraha kraanide kinni keeramist, enam jätkusuutlik. Paljud nendest, kes varem töötasid ehituses ei saa enam enda varasemaid oskusi oluliselt vähenenud finantseerimisvõimaluste tõttu rakendada. Ehitajad olid paljuski aga noored, kelle jaoks oli hea teenimisvõimalus märksa atraktiivsem kui kõrghariduse omandamine. Kui paljud nendest on valmis ja suutelised oma haridusteed jätkama ja kui paljud neist tõukavad ehitussektorist välja endast vanemaid ja oksuslikumaid töötajaid (koos kõrgema töötasuga), mis on paljudele tööandjatele vähem atraktiine, määrab ära ka töötuse tulevase arengu. Laenud tuleb aga tagasi maksta ja nende teenindamist ning uute investeeringute kaasamise võimalusest sõltub ka kapitalik akumulatsioon.
Huvitav oleks teada, kui suure osa suheliselt sügavamast majanduslangust põhjustas Ülo Ennuste hinnangul eeskätt suheliselt käpardlikum majanduspoliitika.
Kommentaar kirjutas Jüri Saar | detsember 7, 2010 |
vabandan selle artikli telegrammistiili – oleks tulnud pikemalt seletada et on inflatsioonikolmik:
nõudlusinflatsioon
pakkumisinflatsioon ehk kuluinflatsioon
maksuinflatsioon
ja et inflatsioon on osa hinnataseme tõusust nn puhas hinnatõus, ülejäänud on väärtusepõhiline ehk hinnalisemate kaupade turule tulekuga seotud tõus; seejuures puhast hinnatõusu arvutatakse praktikas mitmes versioonis (nt meil elamispinna turuhinna tõusu inflatsiooni sisse ei arvestata)
ja et need toimivad kombineeritult kuid muutuvate osakaaludega
praegu meil maksudepõhine komponent on ilmselt nõrk ja põhiline on nõudluse-pakumise elastsuste mäng
nii või teisiti – nagu kriisi alguses olime stagflatsioonis nii ka jälle praegu
stagfatstsiooni puhul on põhiküsimuseks sellest välja pääsemine – muide kompleksküsimus – mis peaks mittekäpardlikes majandusplatvormides olema tsentraalsel kohal
Kommentaar kirjutas Ülo Ennuste | detsember 8, 2010 |
üks mudel kus ka institutsionaalsed valikud:
Click to access linear.PDF
Kommentaar kirjutas Ülo Ennuste | detsember 21, 2010 |
[…] b) samas inflatsioon jätkas meil teises poolaastas tõusu ning novembris oli aastaselt juba üle 5% (http://www.stat.ee/sddsest) mis üle 2,5 korra ületas euroala keskmist ja oli kogu euroliidu tipus – isegi hullem kui Kreekas. Tõenäoselt inflatsioonitõusu tingis eeskätt nn välisnõudluse tõmme kriisist väljunud riikide poolt – aga meie kõvasti langenud majanduspotentsiaali tõttu meie pakkumispool ei jõudnud nõudluse tõusule järele, mida on hõiatanud ka EL Komisjoni Sügisprognoos 2010 (vt lisaks https://yloennuste.wordpress.com/2010/12/07/noudlusinflatsioon/). […]
Pingback-viide kirjutas Kriisipõhjases stagflatsioonis on adekvaatsed akuutsed makrokriteeriumid ning lühiperioodid « Ülo Ennuste majandusartiklid | detsember 10, 2010 |